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LABOR POLITICAL ACTION AND THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
Don Mark Chang*
It is often debated whether unions should "go into politics;" really
they have no choice in the matter. They are automatically in politics
because they exist in a legal and political system which has been
generally critical of union activities.-Reynolds, Labor Economics and
Labor Relations 111 (1949).
With organized labor's growth in numerical strength and ascend-
ancy in economic power came increased participation and effectiveness
in political action.' Efforts to advance the welfare of its members have
been coordinated with vast political programs designed to effect broad
national policy.2 For successful implementation of labor's economic
programs depends on the fashioning of a legal climate favorable to the
collective bargaining process.
However, while there has been development of striking proportions
over the past century in this area, certain factors have presented and
continue to present serious difficulties in effectuating planned political
action. Primary among these are socio-economic factors-for example,
lack of political solidarity among union members, their political apathy,
and their ignorance stemming largely from inadequate union education
programs. 3 Also, there are factors relative to the American electoral
system which have served to impede political action.4 A third obstacle
has been recently introduced: the sweeping ban imposed by section 304
of the Taft-Hartley Act on contributions or expenditures in connection
* Counsel and Director of Research and Education, Hawaiian Federation
of Labor, A.F.L.
IDaugherty and Parrish, The Labor Problem of American Society 243, 244
(1952); Millis and Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley 77 (1950);
Whitney, Government and Collective Bargaining 247-254, 266-268 (1951);
Peterson, American Labor Unions 27-34, 62, Table I (1952).
Labor's range of concern with government has developed as a matter of
practical necessity, in view of government's increasingly important role in the
economic and social affairs of the nation. See Section I of this article.
The elections of 1950, particularly the Ohio Senatorial race, showed that
unless unionists are adequately educated in these respects, they will repudiate
exhortation, reject a nondescript labor-endorsed candidate, and act independ-
ently at the polls. See Daugherty and Parrish, op. cit. supra note 1, at 419-421;
N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1953, p. 19, cols. 1, 2, and 3. Also see Moore, Industrial
Relations and Social Order 578-88 (1951); Reynolds, Labor Economics and
Labor Relations 132 (1949); Mills, The Men of Power 172, 180 (1948);
Peterson, op. cit. supra note 1, at, 39, 40; Daugherty and Parrish, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 239-49; Gaer, The First Round 61 (1944); Rosenfarb, Labor's Role in
the Election, 8 Pub. Op. Q. 376, 384-385 (1944).
'"Even if workers cast ballots in proportionately equal numbers to the
population at large, industrial wage earners would be politically disadvantaged
because of our prevailing electoral systems which favor rural, nonindustrial
areas, with the result that legislation sponsored by labor is frequently defeated
by legislators who have little need to concern themselves about labor's re-
action." Peterson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 38.
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with federal elections.5 In addition to questions as to scope and con-
stitutionality, this provision has presented broader questions of policy
which should be reanalyzed. What effect has it had on labor political
action? Should unions be limited in their political role?
I. Unions In Poliics
Contrary to popular belief, organized workers have engaged in
various kinds of political activity for well over a century.6 Two pat-
terns of political behavior have been developed. One is directed at
the establishment of independent electoral parties on a local, state, or
national scale.7 Another is that of nonpartisan political action.s Per-
haps the distinctive feature of the American labor movement has been
the dominance of this nonpartisan pattern. But this is not to say that
the possible organization of a labor-based third party has been rejected.
On the contrary, there exists considerable sentiment favoring in-
dependent political action.9
Ever since their formation, both the CIO and the AFL have fol-
lowed a policy of nonpartisanship. 0 They have done so for a number
61 Stat. 159, 2 T.S.C.A. App. § 251 (Supp. 1947) (amending 43 Stat. 1070
(1925), 2 U.S.C. § 251 (1940) (Corrupt Practices Act of 1925).
' David, One Hundred Years of Labor in Politics, The House of Labor 90
(Hardma and Neufield ed. 1951); Daugherty and Parrish, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 231-239; Sumner, Political Programs of Labor-1830, Unions, Management
and the Public 222-223 (Bakke and Kerr ed. 1948).
Independent electoral labor party movements in this country have been
traditionally associated with the "radicals," "progressives," socialists and
communists. For excellent accounts of these movements up to the 1930's, see
Reynolds, op. cit. supra note 3, at 99-104, tables at 110-111; Millis and Mont-
gomery, Organized Labor 123-128, 147-149 (1945). For an account of labor
parties since 1930, see David, op. cit. supro note 6, at 104-110; Fred E. Haynes,
Third Party Movements Since the Civil War (1916); Millis and Montgomery,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 238-242.
1 There are three assumptions on which nonpartisanism is based: (1) that
participation in party politics would be a divisive and distractive activity and
would thereby lessen interest in trade union matters; (2) that neutrality
would be the more effective political tactic, since candidates must bid for
labor's support by supporting its program, and since no automatic endorsement
would be forthcoming; and (3) that neutrality is in any case far less risky in
that the defeat of any party would not result in loss of political influence.
Peterson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 36; David, op. cit. supra note 6, at 94, 95.
' 'Within the CIO, there has always existed a body of lively sentiment
favoring independent political action. Some of its leaders, notably Walter
P. Reuther, have made it quite clear that they look forward to the ultimate
creation of a labor-based third party." David, op. cit. supra note 6, at 107. See
also The Boss of the Teamsters Rides High, Life, Apr. 19, 1954, p. 123; Peterson,
op. cit. supra note 1, p. 36n.
" 'Ever since its founding in 1886, the AFL has criticized political participa-
tion by labor as "extravagant expenditures" of organized labor's limited re-
sources. Moreover, its Constitution bars every kind of party politics from
its annual convention. But in a precedent-breaking move in the past Presi-
dential campaign, the Convention endorsed Governor Adla E. Stevenson,
Democratic nominee, while delegations from five AFL locals silently pro-
tested this partisan action. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1952, p. 14, cols. 1, 6.
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of reasons. Our traditional two-party system, coupled with an absence
of class consciousness among the workers, have foredoomed third
parties." This has probably been the most persuasive deterrent of all;
for the experience of the Knights of Labor and many of its predecessors
in their internal dissension and failure to do battle in all forty-eight
states has led to their ultimate self-destruction. Additionally, the
strength of party loyalties, constituting deeply-rooted social mores,
operate against creation of a permanent labor party.12  In another
aspect this factor presents a third reason, the heterogeneity of the mem-
bers economically, socially, ethically, and hence the existence of a
wide variety of interests and membership in other social groups. 3 A
fourth reason why workers prefer to keep old party ties is to be found
in the American primary system of nominating candidates; insofar as
organized labor is afforded a means of seizing control of the major
parties, at least in theory, bipartisanship is encouraged. 4 Moreover,
these parties have been generally responsive to opportunistic rather
than ideological considerations, so that they may serve labor's demands
to insure victory. 5
Thus, nonpartisan policy may be implemented in three areas of the
national political process: in the electoral area, either when legislative
programs, party platforms are drawn up and candidates are nominated,
or where elections are in progress; in the legislative process; and in the
administrative process.' Labor's methods of operations, then, may be
viewed in three stages. The first of these involves the development of
a legislative program to be supported by labor; such a program is
While the CIO, which has risen to power as a part of the New Deal since
its formation in 1936, has been more prone to take a position and agitate for
legislation further removed from the problems of trade unionism, it has like-
wise adopted nonpartisan patterns in its political activities. But with the
remedial and reform measures of the New Deal, organized labor acquired a
new stake in politics, as a result of which the CIO has since consistently sup-
ported not only candidates and issues, but also the politics of the New Deal
in its entirety, and hence widened the scope of its political action. See, e.g.,
CIO News 2, 3 (Aug. 18, 1952); Id. at 5-8 (Sept. 24, 1952); Id. at 2 (July 28,
1952).
See, generally, Barbash, Labor Unions in Action 146-148 (1948); Daugherty
and Parrish, op. cit. supra note 1, at 240-242; David, op. cit. supra note 6, at
91-94, 104-107; Millis and Montgomery, op. cit. supra note 7, at 232-238.11 Daugherty and Parrish, op. cit. supra note 1, at 408, 409.
2 -Daugherty and Parrish, op. cit. supra note 1, at 408, 409, liken these emo-
tional responses to religious faith. See note 3 supra.
11 Peterson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 38; Daugherty and Parrish, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 409; Moore, op. cit. supra note 3, at 578-588; Milis and Montgomery,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 13-18.
, Daugherty and Parrish, op. cit. supra note 1, at 409, 410.
'" Id. at 411. Also see David, op. cit. supra note 6, at 98, 99; Rosenfarb, op. cit.
supra note 3, p. 384.
11 See Barbash, op. cit. supra note 10, at 148-155; David, op. cit. supra note
6, at 95; Reynolds, op. cit. supra note 3, at 122; CIO News 5 (Jan. 12, 1953).
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worked out in the councils of high union officers and in union national
conventions.17 Correllative to this is the selection and endorsement of
a candidate who either shows a record supportive to labor or makes
a satisfactory pledge endorsing labor's platform.'8
Getting out the vote and campaigning for endorsed candidates are
the next steps. Unions have probably utilized the widest variety of
techniques in these electoral activities and more recently have done
so on a scale unprecedented in American labor political action.' 9 These
activities have centered around independent organizations established
by national labor unions and financed by voluntary contributions."0
Chief among these are those of the CIO and the AFL. When wide-
spread expressions in the daily press and in Congress revealed a trend
to curb New Deal labor gains and union participation in politics, the
1943 Convention of the CIO organized the Political Action Committee
to carry on political activity on a more direct and vigorous scale .21
"See, e.g., CIO News 5-8 (Sept. 22, 1952), presenting a digest of the pro-
posals which the CIO presented to the Democratic and Republican National
Conventions, comparing them to the comparable planks in the party platforms.
Also see 59 American Federationist No. 8, 5-7 (Aug., 1952); 175 Nation 44-48
(July 19, 1952).
11 Organized labor almost unanimously threw the weight of their support
behind the 1952 Democratic nominee, Governor Adlai Stevenson. See, e.g., CIO
News 3 (Sept. 1, 1952); 59 American Federationist No. 10, 4; N. Y. Times, Aug.
24, 1952, p. 1; Rosenfarb, op. cit. supra note 3, p. 382.
11 Barbash, op. cit. supra note 10, at 150. Rose, Union Solidarity (1952), con-
ducted a study of the attitudes of rank-and-file union members on selected
issues among the unions in St. Louis, Missouri. One set of questions purported
to determine their attitudes relative to union participation in politics. Perhaps
the most significant indications of the workers' attitudes were reflected in the
answers to the question, "Should the union engage in politics in any one of
the following ways?"
Un-
% decided
Yes No %
"tell members which candidates are friendly to labor 77.3 20.4 2.3
"advise members how to vote ...................... 35.0 62.2 2.8
"help to start a labor party sometime in the future .. 44.9 44.4 10.7
"get union members to run for political office ........... 69.1 25.3 5.6
"encourage union members to go to the polls.............. 92.1 5.1 2.8
"collect a dollar from each member to help
friendly candidates ................................................... 53 7 40.6 5.7
"spend union funds to get laws friendly to labor 71.7 23.5 4.3
"
0 Kroll, The CIO-PAC and How It Works, The House of Labor 121-122
(Hardman and Neufield ed. 1951); Keenan, The AFL-LLPE and How It Works,
Id. at 114. For a complete account of PAC finances, see Overacker, Presidential
Campaign Funds 55-71 (1946).
" As a direct consequence of the passage of the Smith-Connally Act, 57 Stat.
163 (1943), 50 U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp. 1944), section 9 of which prohibited labor
organizations from making "contributions" in connection with federal "elec-
tions," the CIO in July, 1943, created the Political Action Committee (PAC)
to carry on political action directly. The Smith-Connally Act, in turn, was
enacted as a consequence of the large sums contributed to the Democratic
campaign by individual unions in the elections of 1936 and 1940. See further
discussion of this matter in Section II infra.
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At its convention in 1947 the AFL created a similar organization, La-
bor's League for Political Education. 2 Both groups channelize their
work through the administrative apparatus of constituent locals; 23 both
have viewed their primary function to be to gain "... the restoration of
the rights of labor ... and the realization of more sound and equitable
labor relations."24  Together with other labor political leagues,2 5 the
entire labor movement has been galvanized into political action,
ranging from nationally televised shows and speeches to personal
canvassing in local election precincts.26
To secure post-election redemption of campaign pledges from suc-
cessful candidates, organized labor has entered a third field of political
activity. Consequently, lobbying committees have been maintained in
Washington, functioning to have labor proposals enacted into law, op-
pose hostile measures, and carry on publicity campaigns to influence
While there has been widespread feeling, even within the ranks of labor,
that the PAC's establishment represented a departure from traditional union
political action, its activities up to the 1952 elections have been patently
oriented to non-partisan policy. The militant nature of the organization, how-
ever, can only be understood if viewed in the context of the situation in which
it was originally formed. In addition to losses in New Deal strength in the
Congressional elections of 1942, there was mounting public expression of
hostility to labor's active role in politics. See CIO Dept. of Research and
Education 7, 8 (1951). For an account of the PAC's history, see Millis and Mont-
gomery, op. cit. supra note 7, at 235-237. Statements of its purpose may be
found in the Report to the Sixth Constitutional Convention of the CIO 52-53
(1943); CIO News 5 (Jan. 3, 1944); David, op. cit. supra note 6, at 107.
22 Like the PAC, the LLPE was established in 1947 AFL Convention, in
large part a reaction to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, and especially
section 304. See Peterson, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 37.
Authorities generally agree that the PAC, from its inception, adopted a
policy of more vigorous and militant activity than the LLPE, although there is
no fundamental difference between the two organizations. See, e.g., Millis and
Montgomery, op. cit. supra note 7, at 237, 238; Barbash, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 148, 149; Peterson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 36, 37.
-' Kroll, op. cit. supra note 20, at 118-122 (PAC); Keenan, op. cit. supra
note 20, at 113, 114 (LLPE).
-
4Peterson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 36, 37.
Comparable organizations in the larger independent unions are the In-
ternational Association of Machinists' Nonpartisan Political League, and the
Railway Labor's Political League established by the Railroad Brotherhoods.
See, generally, Braunthal, American Labor in Politics, 12 Social Research 1
(1945).
"' See Kroli, op. cit. supra note 20, at 122-125; Warterburg, The House of
Labor 126-133 (Hardman and Neufield ed. 1951); Gibbons, Labor's Task in the
Precinct, 128 New Republic 21 (Jan. 5, 1953); Barbash, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 150. See also CIO-PAC, A Speaker's Book of Facts (1952), and PAC Series
on '52 Facts; IAM, The Truth and Consequences About the Taft-Hartley Law
and Its Consequences (1948); CIO News, Special Issue (Aug. 18, 1952), and
pp. 8, 12 (July 7, 1952).
On union expenditures in election campaigns, see Rosenfarb, op. cit. note 3,
at 379; Reynolds, op. cit. supra note 3, at 122; and Overacker, op. cit. supra note
20, c. 3.
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public opinion.27 However, passage of a law does not insure effective
and friendly administration, thereby necessitating labor participation
in the increasingly important area of public administration. Common-
ly, representatives of labor have been given equal status with industry
on various committees to administer, for example, the Fair Labor
Standards Act.28 Moreover, they have served on advisory committees
to government administrative bodies,29 and labor leaders have been
assigned to key administrative posts. 30
The net effect of labor's political activity is difficult to assess. Many
authorities have attempted to do so.sl There is no question, however,
of its value. For in addition to providing the worker with a representa-
tion of his interests in the national political arena and injecting the
labor viewpoint into the "market place of ideas, '32 political action has
enabled unions to seek and achieve its objectives in a direct and effec-
tive manner, through government.
Why do unions try to influence government? The answer is con-
tained in three broad categories of organized labor's political objectives.
One of these embodies objectives applicable to workers in a particular
industry and so are pursued by national unions operating in that in-
21 See, generally, Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (1942); Sturm-
thal, Unions, Management, and The Public 215-218 (1945).2 Such union participation in government administration reached its peak
during World War IT. Sidney Hillman, then President of the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers, was co-director of the Office of Production Management,
until that office was succeeded by the War Production Board-which agency
continued to be staffed in large numbers by union leaders. On the War Man-
power Commission, not only was labor given a vice-chairmanship, but it was
equally represented on all of its various advisory committees. See Barbash,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 152-153.
"In addition, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion consisted of
an advisory committee on which labor representatives served. Ibid.
On the other hand, this policy of equal representation was temporarily re-
versed shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, at which time representa-
tives of the AFL, CIO, and the Railway Executives Association formed a United
Labor Policy Committee and protested its subordinate role in the mobilization
program by walking out on government defense agencies. The Committee's
statement charged that these agencies "were staffed at its top level exclusively
with men from the executive offices of business" who had no intention or de-
sire to "give labor a real voice in the formulation of defense policy." Labor
Committee's Statement on Quitting Defense Agencies (Feb. 28, 1951), quoted
by Peterson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 43. The Administration subsequently
adopted labor's proposals for reorganizing the Wage Stablization Board and
delegating it authority to settle not only wage issues but also non-wage prob-
lems; moreover, a labor representative was appointed Assistant to the Director
of Mobilization, and the Labor Committee lifted its boycott on the defense
mobilization program.
"See notes 28 and 29 supra and Barbash, op. cit. supra note 10, at 152-155.
"See, e.g., Peterson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 39; Barbash, op. cit. supra note
10, at 146-148; Reynolds, op. cit. supra note 2, at 122; Rosenfarb, op. cit. supra
note 3, pp. 376-390.
"Justice Holmes, dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919). This point is fully discussed in Section III infra.
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dustry. The United Mine Workers, for instance, have been the most
ardent spokesmen for federal legislation requiring the maintenance of
mine health and safety standards, while the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen and other railway unions have promoted laws providing for
government regulation of the railroads and federal employer liability
legislation.3 3 Secondly, there are objectives, broadly characterized as
egalitarian, which most unions have in common. Many have worked
for reduction of every kind of economic, social, and political ine-
quality;34 rights of political participation, greater education and voca-
tional opportunities, an adequate and rising level of consumption and
protection against the major types of economic insecurity have been
demanded for workers.3 5 Finally, there are even broader objectives
beneficial not only to workers but also to other groups in the economy.
Generally, these include the various social welfare and other socio-
economic measures.36
Daugherty and Parrish, op. cit. supra note 1, at 237. The Bricklayers Union,
through the AFL Housing Committee, is one of the most ardent spokesmen for
large-scale housing programs, of the kind embodied in the Wagner-Ellender-
Taft General Housing bill. See 59 American Federationist No. 8 at 8-10 (Aug.
1952).
11 Outstanding examples of this were the political programs adopted by the
CIO and AFL Conventions in 1947 in preparation for the 1948 elections. The
AFL Executive Council adopted and the Convention approved the following:
support of Marshall Plan and extension of aid to foreign countries; support of
the United Nations; reduction of excise taxes and other taxes on consumption,
and increase in gift and estate taxes; support of the Wagner-Murray-Dingell
bill to establish a system of insurance against costs of medical care; increase
in minimum wages under FLSA; federal subsidizing of public housing projects
to provide low rental housing accommodations for low-income families; and,
of course, repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act. In addition to most of these items,
the CIO adopted many other recommendations, including restoration of price
controls, a "realistic" attack on monopolies in the basic industries, an FEPC
law, a federal antilynch law, and a full slate of civil rights measures, reimposi-
tion of the war-time excess profits tax on corporations, federal aid to education,
and extension of TVA principles to the Missouri Valley and Columbia Valley.
Recently, the CIO has vigorously protested the passage of the McCarran-
Walter Immigration Act, e.g., CIO News 12 (May 19, 1952), and filed briefs
amicus curiae with the Supreme Court supporting abolishment of segregation
in the public schools, CIO News 6 (Nov. 24, 1952). See also the coverage of the
defeat of a proposed amendment tightening the Senate cloture rule to facilitate
passage of civil rights legislation in CIO News 3 (Jan. 12, 1953). Similarly the
AFL has firmly and consistently supported sound medical insurance plans to
alleviate high medical costs for wage-earners, 59 American Federationist No. 8
at 17 (Aug., 1952).
.
3 Ibid. Organized labor's advocacy of increased government intervention in
these socio-economic fields does not rest on a doctrinaire socialist viewpoint,
but rather on a pragmatic policy, based on the belief that the American in-
dustrial system should be operated primarily to serve human needs, and that
a right to a decent and secure livelihood should be placed ahead of super-
ficial property rights.
11 See note 34 supra.
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The growth and success of labor's political action in achieving many
of these ends, however, has led to Congressional efforts to limit utiliza-
tion of union funds for these purposes.
II. Secion 304
It was not until 1943 that Congress adopted legislation designed to
regulate union political activity.37 But section 9 of the Smith-Connally
Act was limited in its scope to prohibiting "contributions" in connection
with federal "elections," thus excluding nominating procedures from
its ban.38 Moreover, independently-created groups such as the CIO-
PAC were held not to constitute "labor organizations," 39 so that their
direct political action likewise fell beyond the purview of the law.
40
When organized labor quickly exploited these loopholes, 41 Con-
gressional investigating committees recommended, and the 80th Con-
" Cognate state legislation banning contributions and expenditures by
unions have been enacted in five states: Ala. Code, tit. 26, c. 8, § 392 (Supp.
1945); Colo. Stat. An. c. 97, § 94 (2) (4) (c) (Mitchie, Supp. 1947); Del. Laws,
c. 196, § 23 (1947); 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 3235 (b) (Purdon, Supp. 1948); Tex. Civ.
Stat. Ann. tit. 83, art. 5154a, § 4(b) (Vernon, 1947). Oregon's statute, Ore.
Comp. Laws Ann., § 102-909 (1940), prohibits creation of a "fund in excess of
the legitimate requirements of the unions."
However, three of these have been invalidated. See Alabama State Federa-
tion of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1; 18 So.2d 810 (1944); AFL v. Reilly, 113
Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145 (1944); AFL v. Bain, 165 Ore. 183, 106 P.2d 544 (1940).
An attempt to present an initiative proposal to limit political contributions and
expenditures by unions was forbidden by the Massachusetts Supreme Court
because it violated the free press provision of the State Constitution. Bowe v.
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.2d 115 (1946), discussed
further in Section III infra.
The Texas prohibition, on the other hand, was upheld as a "reasonable
regulation" by the Texas Supreme Court, since the law dealt only with "con-
tributions" like the Federal Smith-Connally Act. AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d
276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
The following contain discussions of state legislation: Millis and Brown,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 324-325, 328, 331; Dodd, Some State Legislators Go To
War-On Labor Unions, 29 Iowa L. Rev. 148 (1944), and The Supreme Court
and Organized Labor, 1941-45, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1018, 1061 (1945); Kallenbach,
The Taft-Hartley Act and Union Political Contributions and Expenditures,
33 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 9-11 (1948); Smith and DeLancey, The State Legislatures
and Unionism, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 987 (1940); Note, 2 Wyo. L.J. 124 (1948); Note,
55 Yale L.J. 440 (1946).
18 See note 21 supra. These prohibitory provisions had no relation to the
remainder of the Act, which was enacted as an emergency law to prevent
wartime strikes. The Act expired by its own terms on June 30, 1947. See Note,
The Smith-Connally Act, 3 Law. Guild Rev. 46, 50-51 (1943).
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921) limited the scope of federal
control over elections to the general election.
" Letter from the Attorney General to Sen. Moore dated Sept. 23, 1944,
Dept. of Justice Press Release (Sept. 25, 1944). See Department of Justice
Clears PAC, 4 Law. Guild Rev. 49 (1944).
1° Unions reorganized their financial structure, providing that political ex-
penditures would be thereafter made from voluntarily contributed funds. See
discussion in the text and citations at note 20 supra.
"I See notes 20, 21, 22, and especially 26 supra; see also Kallenbach, op. cit.
supra note 37, at 6-7.
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gress adopted, section 304,42 which encompasses two areas of political
activity previously unregulated: (1) "expenditures" as well as "con-
tributions" are now prohibited; and (2) these interdictions apply to
general elections and all nominating procedures alike.43 In fact, they
have been so broadly drawn that they have raised a multitude of ques-
tions of construction and constitutionality.
'2 Section 304 provides in part as follows: "It is unlawful... for any corpora-
tion whatever, or any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure
in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential
electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Com-
missioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary
election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of
the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person
to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section.
"Every corporation or labor organization which makes any contribution or
expenditure in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $5000;
and every officer or director of any corporation, or office of any labor organiza-
tion, as the case may be, and any person who accepts or receives any contribu-
tion, in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both; and if the violation was willful, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. For
purposes of this section, 'labor organization' means any organization of any
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which
employees participate and which exists for the purposes, in whole or in part,
of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." (Additions of 1947 are
italicized.)
Special investigation committees of the House and Senate recommended
tightening of federal restrictions so as to extend to expenditures; but while
the Senate group wanted to broaden the regulations to include all nominating
procedures, the House Committee favored the original general election limita-
tion. H.R. Rep. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40, 46 (1946); Sen. Rep. No. 1,
pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1947). In the end the Hartley Bill was adopted
by the House as recommended by the Committee, and the Senate acquiesced
to the change. Hartley Bill, H.R. 3020, and Taft Bill, S. 1126. Ostensibly, the
Section is an extension of corrupt practices legislation. That problem has
been well covered by authoritative analyses and discussions. See authorities
cited in Emerson and Haber, Political and Civil Rights 344-46 (1952).
"There can be little doubt of Congress' power to regulate the making of
political contributions and expenditures by labor unions, as well as by other
organizations and individuals in the interest of free and pure elections and
the prevention of official corruption. . . ." Justice Rutledge, dissenting in the
CIO case, 335 U.S. at 139. Article I, § 4 of the Constitution grants this broad
regulatory power to Congress. United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917);
cf. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). See generally Maurer, Congressional
and State Control of Elections Under the Constitution, 16 Geo. L.J. 314, 324-27
(1928).
" Since the Newberry case, the Supreme Court has reversed its position and
extended federal control of elections to primaries as an integral part of the
election process. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). This no doubt
was a factor considered by Congress when it adopted Section 304.
Both the CIO and AFL attacked the "expenditures" extension, although
they agreed to observe the bans on direct political contributions. See N.Y.
Times, June 29, 1947, p. 1, col. 6, and Aug. 17, 1947, p. 17, col. 1.
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Yet 304 has been subjected to only three judicial tests.4 4 Of these,
the Supreme Court has spoken but once, that decision constituting the
leading case in this field. In 1948, a federal grand jury indicted the CIO
and its late president, Philip Murray, for publishing and distributing
the CIO News to promote a Congressional candidate.45  The District
Court dismissed the charges, finding that the provision abridged First
Amendment freedoms.46 While the Supreme Court affirmed un-
animously, five justices47 narrowed the issues to decide merely that the
newspaper had been "distributed in the regular course to members or
purchasers." This is true, in spite of the fact that the costs of pub-
lication are sustained by the union's general funds without regard to
source.48 Moreover, the majority chose to "express no opinion as to
the scope of this section where different circumstances exist and none
upon the constitutionality of the section,"49 even though 304, "if con-
strued to prohibit the publication, by ... unions in the regular course
of conducting their affairs, of periodicals advising their members ...
of danger or advantage to their interests from the adoption of measures
or the election to office of men espousing such measures, the gravest
doubt would arise ... as to its constitutionality."50
Applying this construction, two lower courts held that a Painters'
and a Contruction Union did not violate Section 304. In one case,
political opinion was advertised in a daily commercial newspaper of
general circulation and over a commercial radio station;5' in the other,
" United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); United States v. Painters Local
Union No. 481, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949); United States v. Construction and
General Laborers Local Union, 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
"A thousand copies of the edition containing the endorsement were pub-
lished and circulated among union members living in the Third Congressional
District of Maryland shortly before the special election of July 15, 1947. The
Department of Justice initiated action eight months after the Act was passed.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1948, p. 1, col. 5. Subsequent events leading to the in-
dictment are described in the N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 26, 1948, p. 1, col. 4, and
Feb. 27, 1948, p. 1, col. 7. These proceedings were initiated only after both CIO
and AFL had made several attempts to provoke the Justice Department into
action. See N.Y. Times, Aug 11, 1947, p. 1, col. 5; July 11, 1947, p. 3, col. 2;
Aug. 7, 1947, p. 11, col. 2; CIO News 1 (July 14, 1947).
40 77 F. Supp. 355 (D.D.C. 1948). The court had sustained a motion to dismiss
the indictment on the grounds that because there was no "clear and present
danger surrounding the enactment of this legislation," the abridgement of the
First Amendment freedoms was unjustified.
" Justice Reed wrote the majority opinion for Justices Reed, Burton, Jack-
son, and Chief Justice Vinson; Frankfurter, J., concurred separately. Justice
Rutledge's dissent, concurred in by Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, is
dealt with in Section III infra and has been quoted in note 42 supra.
40 335 U.S. at 111, 112.
19 Id. at 124.
50 Id. at 121.
11 United States v. Painters Local Union No. 481, 172 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1949).
The indictment had been returned in two counts, the first against the union
and the second against its president in his consent to the expenditures.
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contributions of small sums were made to and expended by the union
for its president, who was a Congressional candidate. 52 Both decided
this issue alone, but with undoubted regret that they were bound by
the High Court ruling on 304's constitutionality.53
Today, most of organized labor's political activity is financed
through the various independent committees created for that pur-
pose . 4 Presumably, the earlier construction of "labor organization,"
excluding these groups from the definition of the phrase since they do
not "deal with employers" concerning working conditions, 55 is yet to
be nullified. The sweeping terms of Section 304 make this a distinct
possibility.5 6 So assuming, nearly all of labor's political activity would
then be held to be financed from the general treasury, and a literal
construction of the word "expenditures" would virtually prohibit all
union political action.57 But the rationale in the CIO case and its
On January 2, 1948, the union placed an advertisement in the Hartford
Times at the cost of $111.14, and paid $32.50 for a political broadcast. The
checks were drawn from the union treasury, which was made up of union dues
and fees. Judge Hincks overruled a defense motion to dismiss the indictment
and held that is was "abundantly plain" that Congress intended to bring these
actions within the scope of the Section. 79 F. Supp. 516 (D. Conn. 1948).
'- United States v. Construction and General Laborers Local Union, 101 F.
Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951). Here, the union and its president and secretary
accepted "contributions" in the form of services rendered by three employees
of the union, and had made "expenditures" by paying persons wholly un-
connected with the union for having devoted a considerable portion of their
time to the political campaign, both contributions and expenditures having
been made in connection with a federal "election." The union president was
a candidate in the Fourth Congressional District in Missouri.
1 Judge A. Hand, writing for a unanimous court in the Painters case, said,
"We should bear in mind the.., important consideration that all of the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court who participated in the CIO decision regarded the
prohibition of the statute if applied to the facts of that case either as involving
an undue abridgement of the rights of free speech, free press, and free as-
sembly, or at best as of exceedingly doubtful constitutionality. Because of the
similarity of the facts before us to those in the CIO decision .... we do not feel
free to regard the issue of constitutionality as one completely of first impres-
sion .... Under the circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the statute
did not cover the publications effected by the defendants in the case at bar."
172 F.2d at 856. See also the language of the court in the Construction Union
Case, 101 F. Supp. at 875; 47 Mich. L. Rev. 408 (1949); 96 U. of Penn. L. Rev.
888 (1948); 16 U.S.L. Week 3327 (1948).
For a discussion of the CIO and the Painters cases, see Notes, 34 Va. L. Rev.
87 (1948); and 7 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 87 (1950).
' See text and citations at note 20 supra.
See text and citations at note 39 supra.
' Provision is quoted at note 42 supra. A court might easily overrule the At-
torney General's construction on the grounds that organizations like the PAC
and LLPE are inextricably intertwined with the structure and functions of the
unions which created them, and this close relationship justified ignoring their
legal separability. Or the Attorney General may simply reverse the 1943 ruling.
" These prohibitions have equally serious implications for corporations. See
the Construction Union Case, 101 F. Supp. at 875. See also Note 47, Col. L. Rev.
135 (1947). See also the President's veto message, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1947,
p. 2, col. 7; N. Y. Herald Tribune, July 11, 1947, p. 1, col. 3.
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thoroughgoing extension by the Painters' and Construction Union cases
-merely to avoid a determination of 304's constitutionality-would
seem to have effectively emasculated the statute.5s
There were factual dissimilarities in both cases which cannot be
overlooked. Unlike the CIO situation, the Painters' Union, lacking its
own publicity facilities, not only had no control over the newspaper's
distribution, but the advertisement in the press and over the radio was
addressed to the entire public.59 Moreover, even though the expendi-
tures in the Construction Union case be trivial, they were clearly made
"in connection with a federal election."0 Labor :unions are thus free,
at least in Connecticut and the Western District of Missouri, to proceed
with virtually unhampered political activity.0 1 And the national labor
press may distribute its products freely.
2
5 "If [Section 304] can be taken to cover the costs of any political pub-
lication by a labor union, I think it comprehends the 'expenditures' made in this
case. By reading them out of the section, in order to not pass upon its validity,
the Court in effect abdicates its function in the guise of applying the policy
against deciding questions of constitutionality unnecessarily. I adhere to that
policy. But I do not think it justifies invasion of the legislative function by
rewriting or emasculating the statute." Rutledge, J., dissenting in the CIO case,
335 U.S. at 129-130.
" See the indictment returned in this case, Hartford Courant, Feb. 19, 1948,
p. 1, col. 4. The Second Circuit said in support of its decision that since the
union had no publication of its own, its use of the local press and radio was
a "natural" means of communicating to its members; and the size of the audi-
ence reached could hardly be greater than that in the CIO case.
On the other hand, there are factual similarities in both CIO and Painters
cases which would seem to be at odds with one of the few consistent distinctions
drawn during Congressional debates. The majority decision in the CIO case
turned not on the source of the funds expended for publication but on the
newspapers' having been distributed "in its regular course;" the court there
said that "The funds used may have been obtained from subscriptions of its
readers or from ... dues . . ., or from other general or special receipts." 335
U.S. at 111. There was no question, however, that in the Painters case the
union had drawn the advertisement expenditures from the "Union Treasury,
which is made up of Union dues and fees." 172 F.2d at 855.
Senator Taft, explaining the Section, had consistently distinguished as
to the source of the funds, saying that if expenditures were made from union
funds, the political activity would be illegal. And the Senate seemed to have
accepted that explanation. See 93 Cong. Rec. 6436-37 (1947); N.Y. Herald
Tribune, July 11, 1947, p. 1, col. 3; and Justice Rutledge's dissent in the CIO
case, 335 U.S. at 138-139.
1o The amounts generally involved were small-e.g., $20, $11.25, the highest
disbursement being $200. The source of these funds was apparently assumed
by the court to have been made from the union treasury, for it considered "not
the degree of the activity, but the type of activity which would determine
whether or not an expenditure had been made." 101 F. Supp. at 876. Illegality
under Section 304, then, as construed by this court, turns on the kind of poli-
tical activity in which the union was engaged. Just where it would draw the
line was not indicated.
"1 There are no state laws comparable to Section 304 in these jurisdictions.
See note 37 supra.
1- See note 26 supra.
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Nonetheless, uncertainty as to how far unions may go in using
their funds for political purposes has somewhat hampered labor's
political program.
It has forced [the local unions, state and national bodies], which are
the logical units for political action, to set up parallel organizations
with separate facilities, separate titles, and separate financing. It pre-
vents the ordinary union channel from collecting political funds, since
the membership of a local union cannot vote by majority rule to have
an assessment collected along with the next monthly dues. Each con-
tribution must be collected on an individual basis. Complete sets of
separate books with separate receipts and accounting systems had to be
set up. In addition, complete records had to be kept of every single
dollar contribution for purposes of reporting to Congress.6 3
On the other hand, section 304 may have had more far-reaching and
lasting beneficial effects-there have been strong indications that all
branches of the labor movement, reconsidering former policies with
regard to political action, have adopted long-range programs of more
vigorous, concrete action than ever before.64 There are cogent reasons,
then, why this statutory ban should be reanalyzed in terms of public
policy.
" Keenan, op. cit. supra note 20, at 115, statement was made with respect to
AFL activities, though it is equally applicable to the CIO. See similar CIO
statement quoted by Witney, op. cit. supra note 1, at 429-30.
11 Just as the enactment of the Smith-Connally Act led to the creation of the
CIO-PAC, the AFL-LLPE was established as a direct consequence of Section
304. See notes 21 and 22 supra.
Senator Morse, opposing enactment of Section 304, warned that "Such
attempts to weaken the political strength of labor will only serve to make the
workers of this country more convinced than ever that they must take a very
active part in politics if they are to protect their rights and freedoms." 93 Cong.
Rec. 6606 (1947). "As Senator Morse expected, the immediate effect of ...
this provision was to stimulate political activity on the part of the unions,"
write Millis and Brown, op. cit. supra note 11, at 596. They continue, "Many of
them used their papers to promote interest and spread information about the
congressional campaigns. Many if not most worked to get their members
registered and paid up as to poll tax, where that was necessary, and to be sure
that they voted. The labor political organizations set up and financed on the
basis of voluntary contributions were active, though they never achieved their
aim of getting contributions from every member. In fact, the reports to the
House Clerk on expenditures in the 1948 campaign showed a total collected by
six major organizations of only $696,004 [citing Daily Labor Report, No. 211;
A-1 (October 28, 1948), with the PAC reporting donations of $306,720, the
LLPE $243,024, Railway Labor's Political League $79,249, Labor's League for
the Election of Truman and Barkley $32,535, the Trainmen's Political Educa-
tional League $16,435, and the UAW-CIO $8,040]." At 653. Accord: Daugherty
and Parrish, op. cit. supra note 1, at 769-770; Keenan, op. cit. supra note 20,
at 116; and Barbash, op. cit. supra note 10, at 157.
More recently, preliminary studies conducted by Gibbons, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 21, show that "in the major industrial sections of the country,
Goyernor Stevenson polled more votes in this year's Presidential election than
President Truman did four years ago." And the CIO has begun an intensive
publicity campaign in support of its intensified lobbying activities in Washing-
ton; see, e.g., CIO News 1-8 (Jan. 5, 1953).
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III. Section 304 Reexamined
1. The Issue of ConsfitutionaIlfy
If the facts of both the Painters and Construction Union cases pro-
perly fall within the CIO doctrine, then section 304 would appear to be
a virtual nullity, and any analysis of the statute's constitutionality
would be irrelevant.0 5 However, a court may yet find factual distinc-
tions sufficient to bring an activity complained of within the statutory
prohibition. 0 Should such a contingency occur, section 304 may be
invalidated on one of two constitutional grounds: it may fall as a prior
restraint on the First Amendment freedoms; or, it may be deemed so
vague that as a criminal statute, it would be void under the due pro-
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment. To reach the constitutional issue,
however, the doctrine of "strict necessity" must be surmounted. There
is forceful precedent to allow it in civil liberties cases.0 7
In the first place, the mere fact that the Statute curbs money ex-
penditures and so constitutes no restriction on free speech as such is
not to say that these freedoms could be effectively exercised. Techno-
logical advances have so far outstripped many traditional concepts in
this respect, that they have provided mass communication media-
radio, television, the newspaper and other types of publications, and
" Each of these three cases has turned on an extremely loose construction
of the word "expenditure." By restricting its scope, the courts have virtually
foreclosed the need for resolving the constitutional issue.
11 All three courts purportedly went no further than to decide whether or
not the facts of the case before it fell inside the prohibitory scope of Section
304. Thus, uncertainty on the part of the unions will continue as to how far
they may use their funds for political purposes, and to this extent the effective-
ness of their activities will be hampered. Only an unequivocal decision on
Section 304's constitutional status can remove this uncertainty-aside from
some legislative solution. See text and citations at note 63 supra.
Legislative history of Section 304 furnishes no clue as to where this line
will be drawn. In addition to the sparse debate which preceded enactment,
what little discussion exists is contradictory and confusing. See 93 Cong.
Rec. 6436-41, 6446-48 (1947).
" ,. ..judgment in the first instance is for the legislative body. But in
our system where the line can constitutionally be placed presents a question
this Court cannot escape answering independently, whatever the legislative
judgment.... ." Justice Rutledge, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1944).
Legislative enactments will generally be granted a presumption of validity;
but when the applicable statute impinges on First Amendment freedoms, the
Court has tended to brush aside this presumption and scrutinize the statute
with more care. See Justice Stone's famous footnote 4 in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), where there is a "narrower scope
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality" when political processes
are at stake. See also Rutledge J., dissenting in the CIO case, 335 U.S. at 139-40;
Note,- Presumption of Constitutionality Not Applicable to Statutes Dealing
with Civil Liberties, 40 Col. L. Rev. 531 (1940); Notes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 595,
603-4, 607 n. 93 (1947); 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 n. 3, 47-51 (1951); 33 Minn. L.
Rev. 390, 392 n. 17-20 (1949). See also Hyman, Judicial Standards for the Pro-
tection of Basic Freedoms, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 221 (1952); Kauper, The First Ten
Amendments, 37 A.B.A.J. 717 (1951); and Strong, American Constitutional
Law, 395-418 (1950).
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motion pictures-to reach niillions of people.6s Since utilization of
these media are made possible only by large outlays of money, 9 it
would seem that access to these channels of communication must be
kept free, if freedom of speech is to have any significance in its modern
context.
Yet, individuals seldom disseminate their political messages to the
electorate' without organization.70 And group freedom-to organize,
to assemble, to form political parties and hence take organized political
action-is well-established in our tradition as a protected freedom.71
The right to speak and the right to make expenditures for group poli-
tical activity, then, are complementary. 72 In the CIO case, the govern-
ment advanced two propositions to justify a curb on these freedoms.
The first urged that section 304 protects union members against coerced
support of political objectives with which they do not agree.73 Except
See generally Emerson and Haber, op. cit. supra note 42, c. 6.
' Because of added costs incurred in the use of these media, expenditures
out of contributions to political parties have risen from nearly $4,500,000 in
1916 to about $21,000,000 in 1944; between 1912 and 1928, costs per vote ranged
between 15 and 20 cents, but in the elections of 1940, 1944, and 1948, the cost
has risen to 32 cents. See Overacker, Money in Elections 75-6 (1932); Over-
acker, Campaign Funds in a Depression Year, 27 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 769, 771
(1933); Overacker, Campaign Funds in the Presidential Election of 1936, 31 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 473, 477 (1937); Overacker, Campaign Finance in the Presi-
dential Election of 1940, 35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 701, 715 (1941); Overacker,
Presidential Campaign Funds, 1944, 39 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 899, 906, 921 (1945);
and Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds 22 (1946).
The days of Thomas Jefferson, who reputedly spent but $50 in his campaign,
can no longer be used as the measuring rod for freedom of speech.
s" "The central theme in our American heritage is the importance of the
individual person. ... The welfare of the individual is the final goal of group
life." President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights 4 (1947).
See discussion of group action to protect individual rights, Wyzanski, The Open
Window and the Open Door, 35 Col. L. Rev. 336, 341-46 (1947). See also the
Bowe case, supra 320 Mass. at 252.
1 Ibid; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937).
By indirection Section 304 nevertheless strikes effectively at freedom of
speech. The Court has in the past invalidated such indirect restrictions be-
cause they were found to have the same effect as a direct ban on speech. See,
e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Cantwell v. Conecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).
Moreover, "The expression of bloc sentiment is and always has been an
integral part of our democratic electoral and legislative processes. They could
hardly go on without it." Justice Rutledge, dissenting opinion, CIO case, supra
335 U.S. at 143. See note 85 infra.
" Unions can act and speak today only by spending money, as indeed is
true of nearly every organization and even of individuals if their action is to
be effective." Justice Rutledge, dissenting opinion, CIO case, 335 U.S. at 146.
See also note 69 supra.
71 Justice Rutledge, dissenting opinion, CIO case, 335 U.S. at 134; Senator
Taft's comment in 93 Cong. Rec. 6440 (1947); Braunthal, American Labor in
Politics, 12 Social Research 1, 9 (1945).
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in unusual situations,74 such a minority would seem to be adequately
protected by union elections and required approval procedures for
significant political expenditures;75 or, if necessary, legislation may be
drawn to meet any of these inadequacies.7 6
The second argument supporting section 304's validity is based upon
the "undue influence" unions have been able to exert in politics by
reason of their "bloc" power and financial power.7 7 But labor's poli-
' The number of cases in which the union is controlled oligarchically are
few; most union constitutions provide for democratic operation and organiza-
tion. For comprehensive discussions on this matter, see Barbash, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 44-68; Daugherty and Parrish, op. cit. supra note 1, cc. 12, 13; Lind-
blom, Unions and Capitalism c. 4 (1949); Millis and Montgomery, op. cit. supra
note 7, c. 6; Peterson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 46-109; House of Labor, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 359-384.
t See Justice Rutledge, dissenting opinion in CIO case, 335 U.S. at 149.
See, for example, the Federal Labor Union, Local 24455, AFL, Constitution,
Art. IV, (providing for election of officer), and Art. V, (providing that a
monthly financial report be submitted to the membership for approval). See
also note 74 supra.
11 The following suggested types of legislation to guarantee democratic
union government, reasonably drawn, would not hamper union leaders or union
functions, and would seem to provide adequate minority protection. (1) Re-
quirements that annual elections be held for the election of officers and that
broad political policies pursued by these officers be submitted to the member-
ship for majority approval. See Lerner, Ideas Are Weapons 517-33 (1939). (2)
Requirement that the majority of the union consent to political expenditures.
See Overacker, Labor's Political Contributions, 54 Pol. Sci. Q. 56, 67-8 (1939).
See, generally, Commager, Majority Rule and Minority Rights (1943);
Baldwin, Union Administration and Civil Liberties, 248 The Annals 54 (1946);
Witmer, Civil Liberties and the Trade Union, 50 Yale L.J. 621 (1941).
11 Justice Rutledge, dissenting opinion, CIO case, 335 U.S. at 143; Overacker,
Presidential Campaign Funds, op. cit. supra note 69, at 807-8, quoted Senator
Bankhead, introducing an amendment to the Hatch Act, as saying that "money
is the chief source of corruption."
But "Congress has always recognized that expenditure of money in elec-
tions is not in itself evil...." Tom C. Clark, Federal Regulation of Election
Campaign Activities, 6 Fed. B.J. 5, 8 (1944) Moreover, there is little to sustain
the charge that labor has in the past wielded an undue degree of influence,
entirely out of proportion to their numbers. In recent Presidential elections,
fourteen million union workers contributed but"4% to 7% of total campaign
funds. See Overacker, Campaign Finance in the Presidential Election of
1940, note 69 supra; Peterson, op. cit. supra note 1, at 33-34 (1945).
Rather than labor, abundant evidence points to other groups who articulate
their views by way of their monopolistic control of the various communication
media. See, e.g., Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible
Press 44-6 (1947); Lasswell, Democracy Through Public Opinion (1941); Ler-
ner, op. cit. supra note 76, at 13-24; Lerner, It Is Later Than You Think 127-34
(1943); Hays, Civic Discussion Over the Air, 213 The Annals 37, 44 (1941).
The N. Y. Times on November 26, 1950 reported that. the AMA spent $1,110,000
within two weeks before the 1950 election to defeat proponents of government
health insurance, and that this sum was drawn from a fund of $3,600,000-re-
sulting from a $25 assessment of each member; the NAM spent $1,037,000 in
1943, preparing for the 1944 campaign; Rosenfarb, op. cit. supra note 3, at 379
and the Republican "spot" announcements during the past Presidential cam-
paign cost an estimated $1.5 to $2 million in air time alone, The Reporter 7
(Nov. 25, 1952).
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tical participation in the electoral process has enhanced rather than
curtailed democratic methods.78 If, indeed, organized labor has abused
its freedom in its political activity, specific Congressional action would
seem more appropriate than a broadly-drawn measure which trenches
on First Amendment freedoms.7 9 For the "most complete exercise of
those rights is essential to the full, fair, and untrammeled operation of
the electoral process."8 0  That is to say, if this vital phase of demo-
cratic government is to function properly, there must be "the widest
possible dissemination of information from the diverse and antagonis-
tic sources."8'
Both propositions, then, cannot support the sweeping prohibitions
of section 304. On the contrary, careful analysis shows that it may
even be invalidated for want of specificity in its vague definition of the
crime. This becomes particularly compelling when the statute effec-
tively sweeps aside free speech and other correlative freedoms, albeit
indirectly. The weight of authority seems to so hold.8 2 "It is difficult
to conceive a statute affecting those rights more lacking in precision,
more broad in the scope of doubt and uncertainty of its reach. '8 3 Such
a statute seems clearly to violate constitutional standards of clarity
and as such should be nullified.84
In addition, Senator Douglas reported that "incomplete reports from nine
Republican committees showed total expenditures of $9,325,000, while six
pro-Stevenson committees, including the political arms of the AFL and the
CIO, spent $2,408,000 or only about one-quarter of the reported Eisenhower
figures.
"I would not be surprised if the outlays by national groups came to as much
as $20 million and that for every dollar the Democrats spent, the Republicans
and their allies spent four or five." The CIO News 5 (Jan. 12, 1953).
" See discussion in Section I supra, and infra.
See Justice Rutledge, dissenting opinion, CIO case, supra note 44 at 145-146.
For instance, election .officials may be subjected to penalties for fraud or
neglect of duty. In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371
(1879); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879). Or Congress may require candi-
dates to file sworn statements of campaign expenses. United States v. Cameron,
282 Fed. 684 (D. Ariz. 1922).
60 Justice Rutledge, dissenting opinion, 335 U.S. at 144.
"
1Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). See also Chaffee,
Free Speech in the United States 348-349 (1941).
82 See notes 71, 76, and 79 supra. The Court has set aside convictions if the
statute under which the defendant had been prosecuted was vague and in-
determinate in spelling out the elements of the crime. United States v. Evans,
333 U.S. 483 (1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81
(1921). See also Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948). See Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 82-84 (1948); Freund, The
Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 533, 540-41 (1951); Aigler,
Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 Mich. L. Rev. 831 (1923); Note, 45
Harv. L. Rev. 160 (1931); Hall, Principles of Criminal Law, 31-49 (1947).
, Justice Rutledge, dissenting opinion, CIO case, 335 U.S. at 151.
84 See note 82 supra.
LABOR POLITICAL ACTION AND THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT 571
On the other hand, should the issue of constitutionality never be
raised by the courts, then the only alternative lies with Congressional
action.
2. Repeal or Amendment
It was not without some justification that organized labor interp-
reted the enactment of section 304 as an attempt to reduce its political
power. The restriction in practical effect is not a regulation, but a
prohibition, which, had it been interpreted literally, would have driven
unions entirely out of political life and activity.8 5 Three courts, how-
ever, including the High Court, have chosen not to do so.s 6 Accordingly,
the constitutional issue aside, there remains the question: how can
political contributions and expenditures be regulated without banning
political activity in its entirety? The issue cannot be resolved unless
it is considered in relation to other efforts to insure honest and free
elections.87 That is to say, what needed controls must Congress legis-
late in regulating political financing to insure honest and free elections?
Experience has abundantly proved the inefficacy of punitive legis-
lation which prohibits political participation by way of contribution
and expenditure. For not only have unions met this ban by organizing
parallel but separate organizations to undertake political action, but
they have greatly increased labor's role and stake in the electoral pro-
5 Witney, op. cit. supra note 1, at 431-32, wrote that section 304's legislative
history "shows beyond a reasonable doubt that all its sponsors had a burning
desire to suppress political opinion in all union publications financed in whole
or in part out of union funds." See Senator Taft's discussion of section 304
in 93 Cong. Rec. 6593-94, 6597 (1947). See Senator Pepper, an opponent of
the section, challenge the section's attempt to deny free speech in 93 Cong.
Rec. 6606 (1947). See also Witney, op. cit. supra note 1, at 428-29; and bitter
statement in the CIO brief, CIO v. United States, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); Daily
Labor Report, No. 80:A-5 (April 23, 1948).
86 See text and citations at notes 44-53 supra.
" Moreover, the issue cannot be decided in a partisan spirit which attempts
to limit the political effectiveness of any group of the electorate. It is
fallaciously assumed by many that by restricting the political activities of
unions and corporations alike by legislation, that both would be equally
affected and treated. In the first place, few memebrs of unions have sufficient
means to be influential in politics unless they can work through their natural
organization, the union. On the other hand, as individuals, executives and
stockholders of corporations are often in such a position as to make sub-
stantial expenditures in political activity. As Senator Pepper points out, supra
note 85, the worker can only approach the political strength of business by
pooling their resources and effective organization for "collective expression."
Secondly, there is considerable evidence that business interests are re-
flected in the nation's press to a much greater extent than are labor's. See
note 77 supra.
And finally, the corporation and the labor union differ in purpose, structure,
and method of organization and operation; if parallels must be drawn in the
name of equity, they cannot be between union and corporation, but perhaps
between union and employer association or some other voluntary associations.
See Witney, op. cit. supra note 1, at 433-44.
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cesses. s Rather than such a negative approach, perhaps improper
electoral activity can best be deterred by reliance on full and prompt
publicity of all individual and group electoral contributions and ex-
penditures.
The passage of a law such as that is not without precedentS 9 A
federal statute so regulates the political parties 0 Section 9(f)(B) of
the Taft-Hartley Act requires unions to file inter alia detailed financial
11 See Section I, and text and citations at note 64 supra. See also Millis and
Brown, op. cit. supra note 1, at 596.
'Ala. Code tit. 26, § 382(6) ("a complete financial statement of all fees,
dues, fines, or assessments levied and/or received, together with an itemized
list of all disbursements, with names or recipients and purposes therefor,
covering the preceding twelve (12) months"); Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 97, § 94(20) (4) (d) (Mitchie, 1947 Supp.) ("The [State Industrial] Commission shall
examine books, and financial records of the corporation at least annually, and
all books and records shall, during business hours, be open to the inspection
of the members of the Commission"); Fla. Stat. Ann. tit. 29, c. 447, § 447.07
(1952) (all labor organizations are required to "keep accurate books of ac-
counts, itemizing all receipts from whatsoever source and expenditures for
whatsoever purpose, stating such sources and purposes. Any member of such
labor organization shall be entitled at all reasonable times to inspect the books,
records, and accounts"); Kan. Gen. Stat. § 44-806 (6) (Corrick, 1949) (every
labor organization with 25 or more members must report to the Secretary of
State annually "a verified statement of the income, expenditures, assets, and
liabilities of the labor organization"); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. § 102-909 (1940)
(requirement to keep books and records, "itemizing all receipts and expendi-
tures and the purposes of such expenditures. Any members . . . shall be en-
titled at all reasonable times to inspect" the books); Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art.
5154a, § 3 (d) (Vernon, 1947) (unions must file annually with the Secretary
of State "a complete financial statement of all fees, dues, fines, or assessments
levied or received, together with an itemized list of all expenditures, with
names of recipients and purposes therefor, covering the preceding twelve
(12) months.")
In addition, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has approved a law which
requires unions to make reports to the commissioner of labor and industries
on all contributions, receipts, and expenditures; these are open to public in-
spection. Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.2d
115 (1946). See similar holding in Alabama State Federation of Labor v.
McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So.2d 810 (1944). On the other hand, courts have
invalidated two of the above statutes, but on grounds other than the merits
of the statute itself. AFL v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145 (1944) (this
section was in'separable from unconstitutional law of which it was a part);
AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (while upholding the
contributions ban On unions, the court found the publicity requirement had no
"substantial relation" to the statute of which it was a part).
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1053 (1925), 1070 U.S.C. §§
241, 242, 244 (1940), provides that any "political committee" which accepts
contributions or makes expenditures "for the purposes of influencing or at-
tempting to influence the election of candidates or presidential and vice presi-
dential electors" in two or more states or as subsidiary of a national committee
must file with the Clerk of the House of Representatives "at designated times"
a statement containing the name and address of each contributor, the dates of
the contribution, the name and address of every person to whom an expendi-
ture was made, and the dates of these expenditures. The constitutionality of
this law was upheld in Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534
(1933).
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data with the Secretary of Labor, but for different purposes.91 And
in 1945, a Senatorial investigation of 1944 campaign expenditures not
only completely exonerated the CIO-PAC of alleged violations of the
then-existing political contributions statute92 but also resulted in a
committee recommendation that a publicity statute be enacted."
Subsequent action on this recommendation was permanently tabledY0
On the other hand, a publicity law imposed on all individuals and
groups, standing alone, is not enough. The broader problem of curbing
high campaign financing must be met with comprehensive parallel
legislation. For publication of electoral expenses and contributions
may be one means of enforcing laws which would set rigid ceilings on
funds to be used in the course of a campaign by a candidate or a poli-
tical party; it may complement other legislation providing for public
financing of campaigns.9 5
91 By its provisions, a union is deprived of all the benefits of the Taft-Hartley
Act, such as the right to petition for election to become a bargaining agent,
unless both local union and its national agent has "filed with the Secretary of
Labor . . . a report showing all of (a) its receipts, (b) its total assets and
liabilities as to the end of its last fiscal year, c) disbursements made by it
during such fiscal year, including the purposes for which made; and... fur-
nished to all of [its] members copies of the financial report. ..
12 Sen. Rep. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1945).
"The Democratic majority of the committee so recommended. Id. at 83-4.
The Republican minority recommended a bill similar to section 304, but
limited to federal elections. Id. at 24, 83. But the majority report criticized
the minority recommendation in pointing up the practical difficulty of differen-
tiating between expenditures for legitimate purposes and those political.
9' S. 1261 (1945). A bill enacting the minority recommendation was like-
wise tabled, S. 1487 (1945). See 91 Cong. Rec. 9762-64 (1946).
"t Senator Douglas has recently announced his intention to introduce such
a series of measures for the consideration of Congress:
I am hot . . . merely concerned because campaigns cost so much.
[See notes 69 and 77 supra.] I am concerned about the vast majority of
big donors who want something in return for their money which has nec-
essarily financed a major part of a campaign of this proportion-con-
tracts, jobs, loans, privileges, legislation, and so on.
I am concerned about the able men who either have no money of their
own or cannot raise any appreciable amount from friends and supporters.
* Such men, despite their virtues, generally do not get selected as candi-
dates for high office, or if nominated find themselves hopelessly handi-
capped.
I have proposed several remedies to reduce the high cost of running
for office, and the problem it creates. First, we must seek greater
financial support of candidates and parties by small contributors. If we
want to make our candidates more independent.., we must be willing
to give more liberally to their campaign funds.
"Second, we must tighten up and more strictly enforce legislation
fixing a ceiling on the total amounts which may be spent for a candidate
or party. The existing legislation [has] enabled the spirit if not the
letter of the law to be flagrantly violated. [E.g., Egan v. United States,
137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943) (corporate funds transferred to officers of the
corporation by various subterfuges, which funds were contributed to
elect Missouri State legislators friendly to the corporation's interests).]
But Great Britain has demonstrated that such limits can be realistically
set and enforced. Of what value in this campaign was the $3 million
limit on national committees, when each part could institute such a num-
ber of 'Volunteers' or 'Citizens' or other 'Committees' as it saw fit?
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Ever since section 304 was enacted, legislators and congressional
committees have indicated dissatisfaction with its mandate. 6 In spite
of the virtual nullification of its effects by the federal courts, if the
political program of organized labor is deemed in the public interest,
and if this program is to be properly effectuated, then the prohibitive
bans on union political activity should be lifted or amended and sup-
planted with a requirement of complete and immediate publicity of
political financing.
IV. Labor and the Nation
In assaying organized labor's role in the American economy, it
would appear to have two major functions. First of all, unions make
Third, I have called for moderate community support of campaigns
out of taxes, a controversial issue originally proposed by Theodore
Roosevelt back in 1907. The community would benefit from public
servants no longer under obligation to big contributors, and from more
widespread participation in public life of less wealthy citizens. Tech-
nical problems . . .must be worked out .... We could start with the
presidency and Congress by fixing a maximum of around 10 cents per
registered voter for each office.
"Finally, the campaign now concluded leads me to stress more vigor-
ously my contention that networks and local radio and television stations
should be required to give a certain amount of time to the major political
parties and their candidates without charge.
"There is no similar obligation for the newspapers to give free space
because they are not using a public property. But they have a moral obli-
gation to furnish fairly balanced and objective news, whatever may be
their editorial policies, and at the very minimum they should not charge
more for political than for other advertising. Vastly higher rates are now
common.
"Such proposals are only the beginning of an attack on this problem
A system of presidential primaries, public reports on the income of
important public officials all seem to me to be a part of a more sensible
approach to political campaigns.
"Others have stressed the need for more publicity of campaign ex-
penses and contributions and for shorter campaigns. Whatever solution
may be finally adopted, 1952 proved the high cost of elections to be a
fundamental problem of ethics in government, with which citizens and
officials alike must grapple." CIO News 5 (Jan. 12, 1953). (Emphasis and
bracketed notes supplied.) See also note 89, 90, 91 supra.
" On July 10, 1947, Senators Aiken and Hatch introduced an amendment
to Section 304 to lift the ban on union political expenditures. S. 1613 (1947)
Senator Aiken remarked that "it was realized by some that [Section 304] went
too far in restricting freedom of speech and of the press." N.Y. Times, July 12,
1947, p. 2, col. 3. And Senator Hatch said that the constitutional question
should be "thoroughly explored here on the floor of the Senate." 20 Lab. Rel.
Rep. 187 (1947).
Another indication of Congressional dissatisfaction with the Act was reveal-
ed by the Ball Committee Report. That Committee was the Joint Committee
created by the Taft-Hartley Act to investigate the operation of the law and
recommend necessary changes. In its first report, the Committee said that it
had "given some thought to the advisability of. .. an amendment ... which
would define and except particular activities of regularly circulated newspapers
and periodicals," and that it would continue to study 304's effects "with a view
to making recommendations for amendment if experience demonstrates that
they prohibit political activity which may be desirable." Ball Committee Re-
port, Pt. 1 at 39-40 (Mar. 15, 1948); but cf. its Report, Pt. 3 at 63-5 (Dec. 31,
1948).
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significant contributions to the discussion of political issues by setting
forth the workers' interest and point of view more effectively than
any other agency is likely to do. To the extent that in so doing the
rank and file workers become politically educated and hence an in-
creasingly better-informed citizenry, this contribution is all the more
significant.9 7 And if government is to be democratically responsive
to the needs of all population groups, unions should be allowed, indeed,
encouraged, to make its influence felt in the policy-making process.9 s
Moreover, there are practical reasons for allowing labor political
activity. Embodied in our national labor policy is an explicit recog-
nition of labor's economic function.9 9 But necessary to the achievement
of its economic program is its activity in the political arena. For labor
should be "free to turn its publicity on any labor oppression, sub-
standard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working condi-
tions."'100 Additionally, there are economic goals which are impossible
of realization through collective bargaining and can only be attained
through legislation. Such things as good public education, unemplo-
ment compensation and other forms of social insurance, adequate
housing and medical care, rather than being negotiated separately
with each employer, must be evaluated and established as matters of
public policy and applied uniformly throughout the community. 1 1
Fundamentally, then, the efficacy of section 304 turns on the desira-
bility of the contributions of labor to the "free market place of ideas"'10 2
" See N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1952, editorial page, col. 2; see CIO-PAC in
Unions, Management, and the Public, op. cit. supra note 6, at 226; Newfeld,
House of Labor, op. cit. supra note 6, at 89.
91 Lasswell, op. cit. supra note 77, c. 10. See DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
365 (1937).
" Section 1 of the Taft-Hartley Act reads in part, "It is hereby declared to
be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate these obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collec-
tive bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of as-
sociation, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment or other mutual aid or protection."
"I Justice Jackson, concurring in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547
(1945). And the individual worker can only gain equality of economic power
with business groups in combination with others. See Senator Pepper's state-
ment in note 85 supra.
"'This is abundantly testified to by both AFL and CIO. "The experiences
and results attained through nonpartisan political policy of the American
Federation of Labor... indicate that through its application the workers...
have secured a much larger measure of fundamental legislation, establishing
their rights, safe-guarding their interests, protecting their welfare, and open-
ing the doors of opportunity, than have been secured by the workers of any
other country." AFL, in Unions, Management, and the Public, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 215. For a comparable CIO statement, see the same book at 225.
See also Section I supra.
2 Justice Holmes, dissenting in the Abrams case, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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and its economic program.10 3 When all the relevant factors are taken
into account, there would appear to be compelling reasons to either
invalidate the prohibitive statute as falling within the bans of the
First and/or Fifth Amendments, or alternatively to repeal or amend
and supplant its all-pervasive provisions with legislation requiring full
and prompt publicity of all political contributions and expenditures. 0 4
" See notes 33-36 and 101 supra. Speaking for the desirability of labor's
continued political and economic contributions, Justice Rutledge said, "To say
that labor unions as such have nothing of value to contribute to that [election]
process and no vital or legitimate interest in it is to ignore the obvious facts of
political and economic life and of their increasing interrelationship in modem
society." Dissenting opinion, 335 U.S. at 144.
204 A reconsideration of Section 304 in this Congress appears unlikely.
None of the late Senator Taft's 16 amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, nor
President Eisenhower's 14 suggested changes relate to that law. See N.Y. Times,
January 28, 1953, p. 1, col. 2; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 29, 1953, p. 6, col. 3;
CIO News, Jan. 12, 1953, p. 9, cols. 3-5; Associated Press Dispatch, January 11,
1954; California State Federation of Labor, Weekly News Letter, January 13,
1954.
-In addition, of the four dissenters in the CIO case, two -remain: Justices
Black and Douglas. The views of Warren, newly appointed Chief Justice, are
as yet unknown. So that here, too, the likelihood of a ruling on Section 304's
constitutionality -appears to be slim.
